> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.taloflow.ai/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.taloflow.ai/security/platform-controls/secrets-management.md).

# Secrets Management

How Taloflow stores and delivers runtime secrets (and why we avoid env vars).

### Scope

This page covers how Taloflow handles application secrets in Kubernetes.

It focuses on how secrets are stored, scoped, and mounted at runtime.

### Approach

Taloflow delivers runtime secrets to workloads using **Kubernetes Secrets mounted as files**.

We avoid injecting secrets via environment variables.

### Kubernetes Secret volume security layers

When a secret is mounted as a volume, Kubernetes provides multiple layers of protection.

1. **tmpfs**: Secret volumes are memory-backed by default. They are not written to node disk.
2. **`readOnly: true`**: Pods can’t modify mounted secret files.
3. **`defaultMode: 0400`**: Secret files are readable only by the owner (typically `root`).
4. **Namespace isolation**: A Secret only exists in its namespace. Other namespaces can’t reference it.
5. **Encryption at rest (etcd)**: Kubernetes can encrypt Secrets at rest in etcd.
6. **No env var exposure**: Secret files are not present in the process environment table.

{% hint style="info" %}
Security is defense-in-depth. The mount settings reduce accidental leakage. RBAC still governs *who can read the Secret* via the API.
{% endhint %}

### Why we avoid environment variables for secrets

Environment variables are easy to leak.

Common paths:

* Included in debug output and crash dumps.
* Visible in some process inspection workflows.
* Accidentally echoed by startup scripts.

Mounting secrets as files reduces these risks.

### Validation notes (for audits and questionnaires)

If you’re validating Taloflow’s Kubernetes secret posture, typical checks include:

* Secret volumes are mounted **read-only**.
* Secret volume file mode is **restricted** (for example, `0400`).
* Workloads cannot access secrets outside their **namespace**.
* Secrets are **encrypted at rest** in the cluster backing store (etcd).


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